Was Mao Really a Communist?
When Mao Zedong visited Stalin in Moscow in 1949, the Soviets were not entirely convinced that their Chinese guest was a genuine Marxist. Molotov reportedly concluded that Mao was more of a peasant revolutionary than a communist theorist. Mao had apparently never even read Marx's Das Kapital.
Whether that story is entirely accurate is less important than the question it raises: Was Mao really a communist, or did he simply use communism to seize power?
Mao certainly knew how to use it. China was a poor, fragmented country, humiliated by foreign powers and desperate for a new political order. Communism offered Mao something extremely useful: a revolutionary ideology, a disciplined political organization, and a justification for destroying the existing establishment.
It also offered something that other revolutionary movements struggled to provide: an international network, a model for organizing a political party, and the promise that China's struggle was part of a much larger historical movement.
But Mao was no obedient student of Marx. Marx had placed the industrial working class at the centre of his revolution. Mao largely ignored that prescription and mobilized China's peasants instead. He adapted communism to Chinese circumstances, taking what served his purposes and discarding what did not.
His real "genius" was not economic theory. It was understanding power: how to mobilize people, defeat opponents, and establish political control.
In this respect, Mao had more in common with the great revolutionary leaders and military strategists of Chinese history than with European socialist intellectuals. He understood the countryside, the importance of armed struggle, and the political possibilities created by a weak central government.
Yet there is a problem with the idea that Mao merely pretended to be a communist. Once in power, he pursued radical socialist experiments with extraordinary determination. He collectivized agriculture, attacked private ownership, and attempted to reshape society according to revolutionary principles.
The Great Leap Forward produced a catastrophic famine in which millions died. The Cultural Revolution devastated institutions, destroyed lives, and plunged China into chaos. Mao even turned against parts of the communist establishment he had helped create.
These were hardly the actions of a man who simply wanted to enjoy the comforts of power.
On the other hand, they were also the actions of someone who seemed increasingly unable to distinguish between the interests of the revolution and his own political authority. When reality contradicted his theories, it was often reality that had to give way.
Perhaps Mao's deepest conviction was neither Marxism nor communism. Perhaps it was his belief that society could be transformed through revolutionary will, provided that he was the one directing it.
This would explain much of his behaviour. Political opponents were not merely rivals. They became enemies of history. Disagreement was not simply disagreement. It was counterrevolutionary resistance.
The consequences were enormous. A political ideology that promised liberation became a justification for almost unlimited coercion. Economic failure could be blamed on insufficient revolutionary enthusiasm. Political criticism could be treated as betrayal. And the suffering caused by revolutionary policies could be presented as a necessary sacrifice for a better future.
Gradually, the man who promised to abolish traditional hierarchies became the centre of an extraordinary personality cult. His writings acquired an almost sacred status. His judgments became political truths. China had abolished its emperors, only to acquire a revolutionary leader whose authority was scarcely less absolute.
There is no reason to assume that Mao was consciously deceiving everyone. Political conviction and personal ambition are perfectly capable of reinforcing each other. A man can sincerely believe in a revolution while becoming convinced that the revolution cannot succeed without him.
Indeed, this may be one of the most dangerous combinations in politics. Ordinary dictators know that they want power. Revolutionary dictators can persuade themselves that their personal power is a historical necessity.
So was Mao a communist?
Probably. But he was also a Chinese nationalist, a revolutionary strategist, and a man with an enormous appetite for power. Marxism gave him a language, a political organization, and a historical mission. Mao supplied his own interpretation of all three.
The interesting question is therefore not whether Mao believed in communism, but whether he considered himself accountable to its principles.
Did Mao serve communism, or did communism serve Mao?
Looking at the China he created, the second possibility is difficult to dismiss.